Why Dowling Doesn’t Squarely Apply to All “Infringement = Theft” Debates

Why Dowling Doesn’t Squarely Apply to All “Infringement = Theft” Debates

Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985) focused on whether interstate transport of bootlegged phonorecords violated a specific stolen-property statute (18 U.S.C. § 2314). The Court concluded that copyright infringement—an intangible violation—doesn’t necessarily fit the physical “taking” language in that statute. Consequently, Dowling isn’t a universal statement that infringement can never be labeled “theft”; it simply clarifies that, under § 2314, copyright infringement wasn’t “stolen goods.”

How to Correctly Reference Dowling

When citing Dowling, emphasize that the Supreme Court examined whether bootleg phonorecords were “stolen goods” under § 2314. They found that depriving a copyright owner of intangible property rights differs from depriving a physical owner of physical possessions. This distinction limited the statute’s reach.

How This Helps the Case

Dowling shows that copyright infringement can’t always be treated as straightforward theft under criminal statutes designed for tangible property. It underscores the importance of statutory language and legislative intent, reminding courts that copyright infringement and classic theft involve very different property interests.